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Abstract—There is no doubt that quantum key distri-
bution is an excellent result as a science. However, this
paper presents a view on quantum key distribution (QKD)
wherein QKD may have a difficulty to provide a sufficient
security and good communication performance in real world
networks. In fact, a one-time pad forwarded by QKD
model with ǫ¯ = 10−6 may be easily decrypted by key
estimation. Despite that researchers know several criticisms
on the theoretical incompleteness on the security evaluation,
Portmann and Rennner, and others still avert from the
discussion on criticism, and experimental groups tend to
make exaggerated claims about their own work by making it
seems that QKD is applicable to commercial communication
systems. All such claims are based on a misunderstanding
of the meaning of criteria of information theoretic security
in cryptography. A severe situation has arisen as a result,
one that will impair a healthy development of quantum
information science (QIS). Thus, the author hopes that this
paper will help to stimulate discussions on developing a
more detailed theory.
I. Introduction
Quantum information science (QIS) may one day bears
fruitful applications. The author believes this, but the
present state of affairs gives pause for thought. That
is, many researchers believe quantum key distribution
(QKD) to be a practical application. Theoreticians have
performed security analyses on QKD [1-7], and experi-
mentalists have demonstrated many QKD systems. They
claim that QKD will usher in a revolution in information
technology, because it has information theoretic or un-
conditional security, something which cannot be realized
by classical information technology. Moreover, they have
represented their achievements to the outside world in
a way that the physics community can now provide the
ultimate level of protection against cyber attacks.
Such prognostications and assertions are not the typical
province of the physics community (at least, those who
are not specialists in the actual technology). So they
should not take such an action, because their behavior
may stimulate unreasonable expectations in the general
public. In fact, there is still a great gap between the
scientific issues and its applications.
Over the last ten years or so, extensive investigations
have demonstrated the theoretical incompleteness of
QKD security [8,9].
The main result is as follows:
(a) One needs to employ a correct evaluation for
guarantee of information theoretic security.
(b) Even the QKD system is information theoretically
secure, it cannot provide a sufficiently uniform random
key bits for application to a one-time pad.
(c) So a one-time pad with a generated key by the QKD
is not secure.
While the criticisms posed by these studies are very
reasonable, it seems that QKD researchers have ignored
them. Yet as a community that belongs to the greater
physics community, they have a responsibility to make
the truth clear to the public, because it is the way of
science. Unfortunately the present author does not feel
that this issue has yet to be dealt with, because their
action is as follows:
“QKD researchers just neglect the interpretation
such as failure probability in their papers without a
correction after the criticism, and they do not care
the meaning of ǫ-security, despite they claim that this
interpretation gives a degree of security in a real system.”
In fact, if the QKD community accepts the criticism,
the present QKD becomes meaningless in a practical
use. Thus, the present paper outlines the problems with
security claims about QKD, as has been pointed out by
a number of authors before.
II. Misconception on the security of a one-time pad
Researchers of experiment claim that a one-time pad
is secure. However, this is not true, because its secu-
rity depends strongly on the randomness of the key
sequence. If the uniformity of the key sequence in a
one-time pad is not sufficient, its key sequence can be
easily estimated with a known plaintext attack. That is,
an attacker can use “the next bit prediction property
described by P (Ki+1|Ki)”. Note that if the key sequence
has perfect uniformity, the one-time pad provides so
called perfect secrecy or unconditional security, because
nobody can predict the key sequences. Thus, to enjoy the
perfect secrecy, one needs a perfectly uniform random
key sequence or one that is nearly perfectly uniform.
On one hand, researchers of theory assert that QKD can
provide such a uniform key sequence with high probabil-
ity (nearly 1), and they make this claim on the basis of the
trace distance formula. Other researchers in cryptography,
however, would dispute that one can generate and share
a perfectly uniform random sequence by using a physical
process such as communication process disturbed by
attackers, because any physical process with only one
access to a generation source of a random sequence fails
with probability 1 to get perfectly uniform randomness,
as is discussed in section V. In the following sections,
I would like to point out that the researchers of QKD
are claiming that they can realize physically impossible
functions such as generating a perfectly uniform long key
bits by a communication protocol.
III. Standard security theory of QKD
A. Requirements to guarantee security
The primitives of security for QKD are as follows:
(a) The laws of quantum mechanics including Heisenberg
uncertainty principle has the consequence that any
measurement by Eve on a channel causes large errors.
(b) Security cannot be guaranteed only by detecting
errors caused by Eve’s measurement. Thus, the phrase
“the Eve’s error is sufficiently large” is not guarantee
of security in the cryptographic sense. The degree of
uniformity of the generated key has to be quantified in
terms of security measures.
(c) A one-time pad forwarded by QKD has to be
guaranteed to be secure against a known plaintext
attack(KPA)
All researchers in cryptography know of the above
primitives. However, many articles in physics ignore
the serious issues of (b) and (c), especially the theories
of Gottesman [10] and so on [1], which focus on only
physical layer like (a). They do not consider problems
from the viewpoint of the user of cryptography which are
the most important ones affecting practical use. In the
time since the above deficiencies were brought to their
attention, the QKD community has tried to incorporate
the issues of (b) and (c) in their discussions[2], though it
is not sufficient. Thus many mathematical techniques in
cryptography have been employed to improve a security
performance. Because of that, no one can claim any
longer that “the security of QKD is entirely ensured
only by physical law”.
The physics issues are still what the literature stresses
[1]. To see where this has taken us, let us visit the
standard theory of security in QKD and check how it
stands up against requirements (b) and (c).
B. Definition of security
In the standard theory of QKD, it is claimed that the
trace distance (dQKD) guarantees the universal compos-
ability of QKD security. In this section, the author will
try to make clear what the main issue is in the claim of
the unconditional security of QKD theory.
In the formulation of QKD theory by R.Renner,
the claim that the generated key sequence provides
unconditional security is made by invoking the trace
distance criterion (dQKD) as follows [2-7]:
Definition 1
The trace distance is given as follows:
dQKD ≡
1
2
||ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ||1 (1)
where ρKE is the density operator of the shared key at the
final stage of the protocol, and ρU is that of a uniformly
random situation. When
dQKD ≤ ǫ (2)
the generated key is called “ǫ-secure”.
C. Operational meaning of the security measure
In order to give an operational meaning to the trace dis-
tance, Renner and his group claim that a uniform random
key can be generated with probability (1 − dQKD), and
the failure probability is dQKD. If one puts the upper
bound of dQKD as ǫ, the probabilities of success and
failure of the protocol are (1- ǫ) and ǫ, respectively.
In some cases, they take the trace distance to have
the meaning of the failure probability of the indistin-
guishability between the generated key sequence and a
perfectly random sequence. Consequently, they claim that
the operational meaning of the trace distance is a“failure
probability”.
Thus, they insist that the generated key sequence is
always a perfectly uniform random bit sequence when-
ever the protocol succeeds. However, they have not given
the mathematical reasoning behind their assertion, and in-
stead refer to its similarity with the classical information
theoretic security model.
Let us cite the origin of these claim. The QKD re-
searchers employ the following statistical distance for-
mulation.
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x) −Q(x)| (3)
which can be related with dQKD. Renner relies on
the following Lemma in his paper to justify his own
interpretation (dQKD gives a failure probability).
(Lemma cited by Renner [2])
Let P and Q be two probability distributions. Then there
“exists” a joint probability distribution PXY , such that
PX = P , QY = Q, and
δ(P,Q) = Pr[X 6= Y] (4)
Though the lemma itself is correct, Renner has started
to stray off course, by interpreting it as a statement
of the failure probability. H.P.Yuen pointed out in his
paper[8,9] that the above statement is wrong, and that it
leads to a misconception about the security analysis of
QKD. In the following, I will detail Yuen’s claim.
IV. Kato’s analysis of the coupling theorem
One of the main problems with the security of QKD is
the operational meaning of the trace distance or statistical
distance. If one wants to give this security measure
a certain operational meaning in information theoretic
security, one has to express it as a probability for a certain
event occurring.
A theorem that treats the relation between the statistical
distance and the probability of an event is called the
coupling lemma, but in this paper I will call it “the
coupling theorem””. Here I will introduce the coupling
theorem and its application to QKD as discussed by
K.Kato [11].
A. Statistical distance in classical security theory
Let us revisit the formulation of information theoretics
security in the classical theory. In Shannon theory [12],
a scheme is called perfectly secure when
P (X |C) = P (X) ∀C (5)
which corresponds to I(X,C) = 0. This means that
C and X are statistically independent. However, to
realize such a situation, it requires that the key sequence
K has to have perfectly uniform randomness. When
a key sequence is not uniform, one has I(X,C) > 0.
But such a mutual information does not provide an
operation meaning of a security when it is not zero (Note
that the mutual information between Alice and Eve in
the QKD model also does not), because Shannon’s
information measure is not “information” in the sense of
cryptography. So some researchers have tried to employ
the following measure.
Definition 2
Let X ∈ X , C ∈ C , and K ∈ K be the message,
ciphertext,and running key, respectively. When it satisfies
δ(PXC, PXPC) ≤ ǫ (6)
it is also called ǫ-secure.
This gives a measure of a closeness of joint distributions
P (X)P (C|X) and P (X)P (C). When ǫ is not zero, one
again encounters a problem of the operational meaning
of the quantitative value of ǫ. To make it clear, one
needs a careful consideration of the coupling theorem.
So far, this brought a serious confusion.
Let us here examine a relation between a statistical
distance and failure probability for certain binary events.
Renner has relied on the coupling theorem. The exact
description is as follows:
Theorem 1 (Coupling theorem)
Let X and Y be random variables associated with two
distribution PX and QY on a finite set. Then we have
δ(PX, QY) ≤ Pr(X 6= Y) (7)
Or there exists a joint distribution PXY such that PX =
P , QY = Q, and
δ(PX, QY) = Pr(X 6= Y) (8)
Unfortunately, so far there was no theory to make the
operational meaning clear. In spite of this fact, Renner
used the second part of the above theorem to justify
his own interpretation of the key distribution model.
From the word of the “exist” in the lemma cited by
Renner, nobody can claim that the mere existence of PXY
enables the statistical distance to be interpreted as the
failure probability. Even if it exists, it corresponds to an
unacceptable situation for QKD that can be checked very
easily as follows:
From the coupling theorem one can make the following
case. Let X be a random variable associated with a
distribution PX on a finite set. One makes a copy of X,
creating a new random variable X˜ = X. This copying
process tacitly implies a noiseless channel. On the other
hand, let us consider that the random variable X is
transmitted through a noisy channel, and let Y be the
random variable at the channel output. How close is
the initial perfectly correlated pair: (X, X˜) to the noisy
channel pair: (X,Y). In this case, one has the special
property pointed out by Nielsen et al [13]. That is,
δ(P
X,X˜, PX,Y) = Pr(X 6= Y) (9)
Thus,
“The statistical distance gives a failure probability”.
But this is a statement about the closeness of a joint prob-
ability distribution of an imperfect correlation between
two random variables and that of a perfect correlation
which is a copy. Clearly this is not a general setting for
a cryptographic model. Newcomers to QKD sometimes
take the above sentence as justification of the failure
probability interpretation without taking into the feature
of the cryptographic model account.
In the cryptography model, we have to deal with the
distance between the joint distribution of an imperfect
correlation and that of perfectly independent variables.
The problem is whether one can get the failure proba-
bility interpretation when the system corresponds to the
cryptographic case. The answer is no, because all random
variables are different and one has to take into account
the general case in the coupling theorem.
B. From trace distance to statistical distance
The trace distance is defined in the first stage of
the security analysis of QKD. Here let ρ and σ be
density operators. Suppose that one applies the same
measurement procedure to ρ and σ, let PX, and QY
be the probability distributions. Accordingly one has the
following relation.
d(ρ, σ) =
1
2
||ρ− σ|| ≥ δ(PX, QY) (10)
Let us recall the trace distance in the QKD model.
dQKD ≡
1
2
||ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ||1
The joint probability distributions for ρKE , and ρU ⊗ ρE
are P (K,E) and U(KU )×P (E′), respectively. U means
an uniform distribution. The statistical distance that cor-
responds to the above dQKD is
δ = δ(PK,E, UKU,E′) (11)
According to the coupling theorem, the statistical distance
is upper bounded by the failure probability Pr(K 6= KU).
δ ≤ Pr(K 6= KU) (12)
If the trace distance is upper bounded by ǫ and ǫ is
the failure probability, one has to conclude the following
relation [11]
dQKD ≥ δ ≤ ǫ = Pr(K 6= KU) (13)
It is clear that the above relation has a mathematical
contradiction, and nobody can claim a probabilistic
meaning based on the coupling theorem (a general
description of lemma cited by Renner)in the QKD
model. Consequently, ǫ-security of QKD has no
interpretation of “failure probability”of a generation of
uniform random key sequence.
C. Another misuse of the interpretation
M.Koashi published a paper titled ”Simple security
proof of quantum key distribution based on complemen-
tarity” in the New Journal of Physics (2009)[14]. This
paper however contains another typical misuse of the
meaning of the trace distance and fidelity.
It claims that the trace distance is bounded by a
fidelity, and the fidelity has an operational meaning as
a probability for certain event. A fidelity is a generaliza-
tion of an inner product between two density operators,
and its meaning is a closeness. But Koashi says that a
general fidelity between two density operators can has an
interpretation as a probability, because the measurement
probability by fidelity form between density operator of
physical quantity and POVM Π = |ϕM >< ϕM |means a
probability. This reasoning has been definitely described
in his book. That is, his reasoning is a similarity as the
following.
Tr{ρ1ρ2} vs T r{ρ1Π} (14)
V. Real security of one-time pad by QKD
So far, an evaluation in the sense of information
theoretic security has been dealt with mutual information
and related function. Reason of why is that authors are
only interested in a conceptual security apart from a
computational based security, not operational security
meaning. A one-time pad forwarded by QKD indeed
needs an operational meaning of the security measure.
Thus, one needs to compare the following proposals.
A. From Renner to Yuen
Here I would like to compare the formalisms of the
security of one-time pad forwarded by QKD, discussed
by Renner and Yuen.
(a) Renner: One can define the security of one-
time pad by the trace distance between a real density
operator for shared key sequence and that of an ideal
situation, because the trace distance or its upper bound
have a meaning of the probability that the shared key
sequence does not have a perfectly uniform randomness.
This is called “Composability”.
dQKD ≡
1
2
||ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ||1 ≤ ǫR (15)
(b) Yuen: The trace distance has no interpretation of
failure probability. Then, since one-time pad is a kind of
stream cipher, one has to evaluate the security by a next
bit prediction or related concept like a standard theory
of cryptography. So the one-time pad forwarded by QKD
has to be directly evaluated by
P (K|YE) = 2
−Hmin(K|YE) ≤ ǫY (16)
where YE is the measurement data by Eve’s optimum
POVM, Hmin is a min entropy.
B. A correct theory of security evaluation of QKD
Almost all theoretical discussions of the security of
QKD have dealt with only the physical errors of Eve.
They say in effect that “the errors of Eve are sufficiently
large, so the system is secure”. But in cryptography, one
has to ensure security for the encryption of the data.
Let us check out the story of the physical process of
QKD and its application to a data encryption such as
a one-time pad. Consider a hybrid cipher consisting of
a one-time pad and QKD. How can we realize perfect
secrecy with this hybrid cipher ? A one-time pad is a
perfectly secure when and only when a key sequence of
the same length of the plaintext (message) is a perfectly
uniform random number. That is, Eve’s estimation proba-
bility P (K|YE)for the key sequence before one-time pad
encryption is
P (K|YE) = 2
−|K| (17)
where YE is the measurement data of Eve, ΠK is a
optimum POVM, and |K| is the key length.
The security evaluation in the present theory relies on
the trace distance, i.e., ǫ-security. The point is “What
meaning does ǫ have ?”. It is not the failure probability,
but is related with the uniformity of the key sequence.
That is, it gives an upper bound for Eve’s estimation
probability of the generated key sequence as follows:
Theorem 2 [9]
Let < dQKD >= ǫ¯ be the averaged trace distance with
respect to a random error correcting code EC and privacy
amplification code PA. The upper bound of the averaged
estimation probability of the key sequence is given by
< P (K|YE) > ≤ ǫ¯+ 2
−|K| (18)
where |K| is the key length.
The above theorem says that the trace distance and
its upper bound give an upper bound of the estimation
probability of whole key sequence, and also asserts that
the estimation probability corresponds to the degree
of uniformity of the key sequence. If the estimation
probability is very large in comparison with a perfectly
uniform, any security analyst knows of many known
plaintext attacks against the one-time pad using such a
non-uniform key sequence. So it may be very weak in
comparison with computationally secure encryption even
though it has information theoretic security described
by < P (K|YE) >∼ ǫ¯, because a one-time pad has no
complex algorithm to encrypt the data sequence, and
algorithm is not necessary to break it. I will show a
meaning of the above in the following.
C. Security of ciphertext only attack
Let C = X ⊕K be the ciphertext of a one-time pad
by the generated key of QKD. Eve can obtain the exact
ciphertext, so her estimation probability can be translated
into
P (K|YE) = P (K|C) (19)
The QKD researchers give a bound of dQKD as the
average over the random EC and PA. So one should
use the Markov inequality to converts the averaged
evaluation to an individual one. Thus we have
Theorem 3 [9]
Let us assume the averaged ǫ-security as follows:
< dQKD > ≤ ǫ¯. After application of the Markov
inequality two times, one gets
P (K|C) ≤ ǫ¯1/3 + 2−|K| (20)
Let us consider an example. Here we assume that
< dQKD > ≤ ǫ¯ = 10
−6 (21)
From the theorem 2, one has
< P (K|C) > ≤ 10−6 + 2−|K| (22)
When the length of the generated key is |K| = 104, the
security requirement of the key estimation probability is
order of 10−3000. That is,
10−3000 << 10−6 (23)
Thus 10−6 is excessively large and it does not give the
sufficient security guarantee.
From the theorem 3, the worst case is as follows:
P (K|C) ≤ ǫ = 10−2 (24)
where ǫ = ǫ¯1/3. This means that 104 bits key sequence
may be estimated with the probability ∼ 1/100
.
On the other hand, in another point of view, one can
understand the following property. One bit may be leaked
for every f bits in |K| = l generated key bits, wherein f
is
f = log2
1
ǫ
(25)
That is, the following key bits may be leaked per protocol:
|K|leak =
l
f
=
l
log(1/l)
(26)
When |K| = l = 104, and ǫ¯ = 10−6 (the best
experimental result), it means ǫ = 10−2. So about 1,500
bits per 10,000 bits may be leaked.
D. Security of known plaintext attack
One-time pad is a stream cipher, so one needs to check
a property of next bit prediction of the key sequence.
I will discuss here the real meaning of the quantitative
security guaranteed by ǫ-security. Let K be the generated
key sequence, and let K(KP ) and K(Re) be known
key sequences in the generated key from some known
plaintext and the remaining key sequence, respectively.
From the cryptography theory of stream cipher, one
has to consider the next bit prediction property. This is
just a procedure that one tries to estimate the remaining
key sequence K(Re) from the knowledge of K(KP ).
Theorem 4 [15]
Let us consider a one-time pad by an imperfect random
key sequence generated with ǫ-security, where ǫ ≡ 2−m.
When the known keys |K|(KP ) = m bits, there exists
the next bit sequence prediction property as follows:
P (K(Re)|K(KP )) ∼ 1 (27)
Since a one-time pad has no computational complexity,
the remaining part of the key and plaintext may be
instantly exposed by any determined high school student.
Consequently, generated key sequence by QKD does
not have sufficient security if ǫ is not on the order
of 2−|K|(Re) . If ǫ in a real QKD is one the order of
10−6 ∼ 10−14, the one-time pad forwarded by such
QKD is completely insecure.
VI. Limitation of security
In this section, we discuss limitations of security in a
real QKD.
A. Trade-off between ǫ and key rate
Let us show that even with the most favorable treat-
ment, the present QKD scheme comes to naught as a
security guarantee. Many experimental studies on QKD
discuss only the key generation rate r and do not indicate
the value of ǫ¯. According to security theory, they have
to show how much ǫ¯ is realized for their own key rate,
because there is a trade-off between the key rate and ǫ¯.
Tamaki and Tsurumaru claimed in the QIT workshop that
one can set ǫ¯ arbitrarily. But in making this claim, they
ignored the following fact. Tomamichel et al. [6] showed
the trade-off between ǫ¯ and key rate. An ǫ¯-secure key can
be extracted out of the reconciled key of length,
l(ǫ¯) ≤ n(1− h(Q+ µ))− LeakEC − log
2Pfail
ǫ¯2ǫcor
(28)
where n is the block length. This is a function of ǫ¯. Let
us check the property of Eq(26). They fixed the security
rate as
S =
ǫ¯
l
= 10−14 (29)
Then, they gave numerical examples for the key rate.
When the block length is from 107 to 104, the rate is
10−1 ∼ 10−2. This means ǫ¯ = 10−8 ∼ 10−12. As
a result, the best security parameter ǫ¯ is one with a
vanishing key rate as follows:
< dQKD > ≤ ǫ¯ = 10
−14
r =
l
n
∼ 0 (30)
This fact was pointed out by Yuen and Kanter. Thus,
experimentalists have to show both parameters (ǫ¯, r),
otherwise the experimental demonstration has no meaning
in the sense of cryptography.
Consequently, the best averaged ǫ-security of QKD
system even with sophisticated devices is 10−14 for a
block length of 104 bits under the zero rate. If one expects
the secure one time pad based on these keys, one needs
ǫ ∼ 10−3000. This is impossible in a real setting. So QKD
is not practical at all.
B. Limitation of privacy amplification
In general, QKD researchers claim that a privacy
amplification based on Hash function is a key technology
to enhance a security of shifted key. A role of the Hash
function is to reduce a length of generated key for
making a uniformity in bit sequence of the generated
key. However, since one has to open what kind of Hash
function is used, “knowledge” of Eve on the bit sequence
before the privacy amplification is not reduced. Thus,
one has to accept the following.
Theorem 5
Any privacy amplification does not improve P (K|YE)
which is fixed at shifted key phase.
The above is clear from information causality.
C. Physical limitation of uniformity in random num-
ber generation
Let us discuss the interpretation problem from the
experimental point of view. The QKD researcher claims
that they can realize, by the sophisticated technology,
average of ǫ with respect to random EC and random PA
as follows:
ǫ¯ = 10−6 ∼ 10−14 (31)
for the total generated key |K| = 104 bits. They insist
that an upper bound of the trace distance ǫ¯ is the failure
probability for getting the uniform random variable and
they say that always the uniformity of the generated key
is ensured.
However, Yuen has repeatedly pointed out that, from the
physical point of view, the failure probability for getting
a perfectly uniform random variable is always one [9].
That is,
Remark:
When the trace distance dQKD is not zero, the real
failure probability to get a perfectly uniform key
sequence is nearly 1, and the failure probability is
practically independent of the value of the trace distance
(or its classical correspondence:statistical distance).
Iwakoshi reported an experimental study in the QIT
workshop on the relation between the statistical distance
and the uniformity of a sophisticated physical random
number generator[16]. His results showed that the
statistical distance between the real distribution and the
uniform distribution defined mathematically is δ ∼ 10−4,
but a perfectly uniform random variable defined by the
mathematics is not given. That is, the failure probability
is Pr(K 6= KU) ∼ 1, and it is independent of δ.
S.Takeuchi said that its result seems obvious, that is,
nobody can generate a perfectly uniform random variable
by a physical process. “Iwakoshi agreed that the exper-
iment is physically obvious and that its insignificance
is the point. The problem is that the QKD community
says that when one generate 104 bits key by QKD, it
does not fail to generate a perfectly uniform random
variable defined mathematically except for the probability
Pr(K 6= KU) = δ ≤ ǫ¯ = 10
−6 ∼ 10−14”. In QKD
model, since Alice and Bob cannot access the source of
correlation controlled by Eve, the above situation has a
similarity to QKD model.
Thus, the above discussions verify what Yuen wants to
claim, and reveal the peculiarity of the failure probability
interpretation.
VII. Conclusions
(a) In general, one needs to give an operational
meaning to the security measure,i.e.,-trace distance.
However, one cannot interpret the trace distance as
“a failure probability” of the protocol itself or of the
indistinguishability between the generated key and a
perfectly uniform key sequence. In fact, the interpretation
of ǫ as a failure probability is wrong (see figure 1).
(b) A one-time pad forwarded by QKD is not
superior to conventional cipher even if such a hybrid
one has information theoretic security, because it has
a possibility that the generated key sequence can be
instantly estimated (time is zero) by a known plaintext
attack against the one-time pad (see figure 2). It is
true, even if ǫ¯ is the order of 10−20, and further
that it is impossible to realize arbitrarily small value
of ǫ¯ due to the physical properties of quantum or
optical channels. On one hand, Eve needs still time
to decrypt conventional cipher. Thus, any phrase to
the effect “Information theoretic security is superior to
computational security” has to be carefully used when
one applies their own measure to security in a real-world
setting.
(c) If one wants to show the usefulness of QKD,
one has to prove the existence of a real system with
ǫ ∼ 10−3000 for the generated key |K| = 104 bits, as an
example.
Finally, users of QKD should ask QKD researchers “why
they do not show an understandable operational meaning
of the security based on the quantitative value of own
security measure. A thorough discussion of QKD and a
remedy to its problem are given in [8,17-19,20].
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Fig. 1. Difference between security formulae of QKD system. Standard
theory of Renner is clearly summarized in [21] under the wrong
justifications.
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APPENDIX
A. Relation between quantum detection theory and trace
distance
Portmann and Renner claimed that Helstrom’s formu-
lation gives a justification of the probability interpretation
of the trace distance in their paper [21]. This is an
evidence that they do not understand a physical meaning
of quantum detection theory. In fact, Yuen repeatedly
explained that this justification is wrong [19], and Kato
and Iwakoshi gave more detailed explanation.
The process of the detection has a definite physical
meaning wherein the observer accesses to physical sys-
tem described by two density operators. The process is
described by POVM Π in general, and the minimum error
in the action of detection is given by Helstrom’s formula
mini{Π}Pe =
1
2
(1− ||ρ1 − ρ2||1) (32)
From the above result, Portmann et al interpreted that
the second term itself means also a probability. The trace
distance appeared in the QKD problem does not means
the action of the detection. It mere describes a physical
situation as a closeness between two density operators.
The trace distance is just a parameter in detection prob-
lem, and trace distance itself cannot have a meaning of a
probability in any situation. Koashi took the same error
in which he gave an interpretation of a probability to
own fidelity formulation. His justification is such that the
fidelity form between signal density operator and POVM
gives a probability, so a probability interpretation of the
fidelity is applicable to the QKD problems. But, fidelity
is just inner product for two density operators in QKD
setting.
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Fig. 3. Origin of misconception
B. Fake proof of coupling theory
The coupling theory is a common concept in the
probability theory[22]. However, Portmann and Renner
have twisted the theory to justify own interpretation [21],
using the word of “there exist”. Kato again clarified their
trick as follows [11]:
In general, the inequality in coupling theory is as follows:
P (X 6= Y ) ≥ δ (33)
QKD needs
P (X 6= Y ) ≤ δ (34)
If one uses a word of ”there exist”, one can use ≤ in the
coupling theory, because = is ensured in the coupling
theory. However, there is no case of = in QKD setting
(see figure 3). If Portmann et al would like to claim
own justification, they should discuss the coupling theory
under the conditions imposed by physical model of QKD.
C. Distinguishing advantage formulation vs success
probability formulation
The origin of the distinguishing advantage formulation
come from the modification of a game theory in a
classical setting, wherein there were no clear discussion
on an operational meaning of the distinguishability. But,
the present QKD theory employed such a formulation
without careful consideration. Thus, to ensure a crypto-
graphic security, the distinguishing advantage formulation
is forced to employ a failure probability interpretation of
trace distance. However there are two intrinsic problems.
(1) Eve has “knowledge” on key before privacy amplifica-
tion (PA). But PA can only handle a subset of Eve’s whole
knowledge. Although the output of PA seems a uniform
key, it does not mean that the key is also uniform key for
Eve.
(2) The trace distance for the final key sequence also has
no binary interpretation like “yes or no” due to failure
probability.
Why can one say based on such features of the formalism
that the trace distance ensures the composability. Thus
there is a chain of misconception in this formulation. One
has to employ success (or guessing) probability formu-
lation based on M-ary quantum detection theory which
have been developed by Holevo, Yuen and Hirota school
to unify information theoretic security. Fortunately, an
evaluation of the trace distance can be transformed into
success probability evaluation by Yuen’s formula.
P (K|YE) ≤ dQKD + 2
−|K| (35)
D. Total efficiency of key generation
A communication performance is one of the most
important features in information science. We cannot
avoid an imperfection of communication equipments in a
real world. Especially, the energy loss in a channel and
a detector for single photon gives serious degradation of
communication performance. In the conventional QKD
system, random bits of about 50 Gbit/sec (50× 109) are
transmitted from Alice, and the final keys of 300 Kbit/sec
(300× 103) are shared between Alice and Bob. Thus to
realize a one-time pad communication system with 300
Kbit/sec, QKD system uses an optical communication
technology for 50 Gbit/sec. So far there was no such a
greatly inefficient technology.
